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Abstract: With the deepening of the research and development in the field of embedded devices,
the paradigm of the Internet of things (IoT) is gaining momentum. Its technology’s widespread
applications increasing the number of connected devices constantly. IoT is built on sensor networks,
which are enabling a new variety of solutions for applications in several fields (health, industry,
defense, agrifood and agro sectors, etc.). Wireless communications are indispensable for taking
full advantage of sensor networks but implies new requirements in the security and privacy of
communications. Security in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) is a major challenge for extending
IoT applications, in particular those related to the smart-agro. Moreover, limitations on processing
capabilities of sensor nodes, and power consumption have made the encryption techniques devised
for conventional networks not feasible. In such scenario, symmetric-key ciphers are preferred for
key management in WSN; key distribution is therefore an issue. In this work, we provide a concrete
implementation of a novel scalable group distributed key management method and a protocol
for securing communications in IoT systems used in the smart agro sector, based on elliptic curve
cryptography, to ensure that information exchange between layers of the IoT framework is not
affected by sensor faults or intentional attacks. In this sense, each sensor node executes an initial key
agreement, which is done through every member’s public information in just two rounds and uses
some authenticating information that avoids external intrusions. Further rekeying operations require
just a single message and provide backward and forward security.
Keywords: elliptic curves; Diffie–Hellman; discrete logarithm problem; security protocol; secure key
exchange; wireless sensor networks; sensor networks security; IoT networks; IoT security; smart-agro
1. Introduction
Agriculture has gone from being a major asset in the world’s food to being a key not only to food
but also to sustainability and non-harmfulness, both to the environment and to people. The necessary
increase in productivity to cope with the increase of the world’s population and the constraints under
which this increase in productivity is subject due to climate change means that ecological procedures
are not sufficient. It is in this context that the Internet of Things (IoT) emerges, as it has the potential to
take control and monitoring (and thus decision-making) to another level [1].
The agricultural sector is facing impressive challenges arising from population growth, which
demands more and more resources and their search has to be carried out in a sustainable manner.
The use of technology is a crucial factor in achieving sustainable production. For instance, in [2],
the authors set out the problem arising from the need to use water in a sustainable and responsible
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manner, which requires highly accurate and expensive sensor-based systems and IoT technology.
However, manufacturers invest great efforts in generating accessible technology based on low-cost
devices that are supported or required by data connections with nodes that allow realistic monitoring
and therefore water savings. All of this is due to the advances in IoT and Wireless Sensor Network
(WSN) technology, core to IoT that consists of tiny autonomous low-cost low-power devices that
carry out monitoring tasks. WSNs can nowadays be found in many civil applications; see Figure 1.
The devices, in Figure 1, in stage 1 (data collected) are called sensor nodes and the monitored data
are typically sent to a base station, stage 2, that will be later processed in data mining servers, stage 3,
to later serve as intelligence information used in stage 4 to adopt strategies. All of the sequence
depends on the data gathered during stage 1. It is key to ensure that sensor nodes are operating
properly, and that they are not being attacked or supplanted. Under these circumstances, the data
gathered can drive the whole system to a failure, affecting the sustainability of the production. To this
end, the proposed method secures the information exchange by means of a lightweight and efficient
protocol implemented in each node. A faulty node (not callibrated) can request to be excluded from
the secured group, avoiding that corrupted data reaches upper layers. On the other side, if new sources
of information are intentionally created, these will be discarded as they are not part of the secured
group of sensor nodes.
Figure 1. Stages from collecting data to processing information: the importance of securing the data.
The evolution of technology has made it possible to create such integrated devices that, although
limited in computational resources, can execute relatively complex tasks. This, together with
the new wireless communication protocols specially designed for the exchange of information, allows
the agricultural sector to equip itself with relatively cheap monitoring systems, capable of feeding
information to decision support systems that allow decisions to be made about crop strategies and also
allow resources to be saved. In [3], the authors demonstrate how precision agriculture and smart
agriculture have evolved positively thanks to the application of these technologies. In addition,
the authors of both [2,3] stress the need for security measures to ensure the quality of the data collected,
as shown in Figure 1.
The work presented in this paper is a method to secure the information sent from sensors, in stage 1
(see Figure 1, to the Business Intelligence layer of the IoT Smart-Agro architectures. From its very
beginning, the IoT architecture has been considered to be divided into three layers: the perception,
network, and application layer. An evolution of this approach suggests that an intermediate layer
is placed between the network and application layers, called a service layer. This service layer is
submitted to sensors’ malfunctioning or by intentional attacks from, for example, competing companies
(It is very easy to inject fake sensor data from soil sensors to the cloud, trying to emulate a valid
sensor. This data can pollute how the—for example—water irrigation system will act when sending
actuators the order to water olive-trees, for example). If fake information is sent to the gateway node,
this information will be uploaded to the cloud. In addition, the result will produce an excessive
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watering of some trees that later will produce bigger and less productive olives (spending a lot of
water in regions where the water scarcity is a problem), or, by not sending the correct amount of water,
will negatively affect the tree.
In [4], authors presented a new architecture based on four layers: things, edge, communication,
and cloud. Figure 2 shows the architecture models and their evolution. The starred layers are those
affected by the information gathered from the nodes.
Figure 2. Evolution of the Internet of Things (IoT) architecture for smart agro.
The recommended architecture for smart-agro IoT platforms, as authors in [2] recommend,
is depicted in Figure 3. It is important to note the role of the security layer that connects devices
(sensor nodes) with applications (cloud computing, business intelligence layer); therefore, security
is an important issue. However, security is not only applied at the highest-level layers but applied
from the lower-level layer upwards. The proposed method ensures that the devices are operating
correctly, enforcing this layer. The importance of the designed method and the proposed protocol lies
in the power to ensure that reliable information will only reach the upper layers (which are precisely
the ones that give it the term “smart”-agro). Thus, we are allowing that all the logic associated with
crops will not be contaminated with incorrect data, the consequence of which can be fatal for the
sustainable aspect of agriculture.
Figure 3. Recommended IoT architecture of smart agro developments.
Our proposed method and protocol are both capable of securing the integrity of the sensor nodes,
and therefore the quality of the information that reaches the upper layers (responsible for creating
intelligence); few resources from these nodes are required to add this extra layer of security that is
capable of protecting nodes and information in different stages that last a few milliseconds.
According to the Machina research report, the number of connected agricultural devices is
expected to grow to 225 million by 2024. When IoT devices are implemented, the employed
communication technologies are a key point to achieve successful operation. Protecting this is necessary
to any IoT Smart Agro platform.
The architecture of systems based on IoT and wireless sensor networks is similar to other
software architectures or information systems, but with the particularity of remote identification,
sensorization, and control of remote objects using devices that embed sensors and actuators [5].
There has been an attempt to standardize the development of IoT-based architectures, but it is
still a highly fragmented [6] field, mainly to formalize how to sensor and control objects that
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provide information, but without success. This seriously affects safety aspects and can compromise
the processed information and the strategies derived from this information processing [7]. However,
it is worth mentioning that the community is increasingly focused on developing security measures
that control the quality of data collected and submited (see Figure 1, as is the case with this paper [8]
in which the authors design a data clustering protocol to provide high quality data, it is almost
the work presented in [9] that much care is put on the data quality but not on who collects (or
injects) it. Our work focuses on the legitimacy of the nodes that provide information. To achieve this,
we introduce an implementation of a novel, efficient, and secure protocol to enable the secrecy among
the communicating nodes of a WSN based in trusted Key Management sharing scheme to allow the
fast rejection of messages or data injected in the network by not authorized sensor nodes. In [10],
a classification and overview of the existing protocols is available.
As mentioned above, IoT architectures suffer from significant fragmentation [5]. When their
use in the agricultural sector is considered, the issue is even more worrying since the threats to
the cyberphysical system can affect not only the infrastructure but also people [11]. The threats that
affect these systems are no different from those suffered by any other information system (although
the Internet Engineering Task Force has conducted a study on which are the most worrying [12])
and these range from attacks on device firmware to the exploitation of software defects, through device
cloning. However, among all the threats that should be prioritized are those that allow an attacker
to access the information operating in the sensor network, both to read it and to inject erroneous
information that leads to the entire system and its associated processes to states of inoperability
and ineffectiveness. Even if the nodes are reverse-engineered, an attacker should not be allowed to
inject information into the system, and this is a resolved priority in this work. When the node is
manipulated, it is disconnected and the operation key of the rest of the nodes is regenerated.
Our aim in this work is to provide an application of the protocol introduced in [13] for
group key management in dynamic communicating groups that behaves very efficiently in the
initial key agreement, with just two rounds, and that scales perfectly with just one message per
rekeying operation.
2. Proposed Cryptographic Methods
It is proposed to create a method to authenticate sensor nodes through which it is possible to
identify which nodes will be able to send the information collected from the sensors to the upper
layers of the Smart Agro IoT architecture and which nodes will not be able or will simply be ignored.
Thus, group-based key distribution methods is a feasible solution to this end. These methods must be
carefully designed so that they do not exceed the resources available at the sensor nodes.
Group Key Management (GKM) is a main concern mainly due to the huge development of
multiparty communications that apply in many situations nowadays. For this reason, distributed
GKM is becoming very popular and there exist many approaches trying to provide effective protocols
to this end. In a distributed GKM, members in the group collaborate to build a common key to be
used in secure communications. This way, they get somehow federated and a certain level of trust
is put in the data they send to the servers. Attacks to these services are quite simple if the sources
of the data are not secured. These services are used to implement data mining techniques (Figure 1);
therefore, a layer of trust is necessary. An interesting example is that of nodered (http://nodered.org/),
a tool for wiring together hardware devices, APIs, and online services that is used in settings like [14].
A tool that by default is not secured; anyone who can access the IP address and port it is running on
can access the editor and deploy changes. However, in environments where GKM is used, nodes are
securely grouped and the data they send is trusted.
The first key exchange was introduced by Diffie and Hellman in [15] and shows a collaborative
way between two communicating parties agreeing in a common way. However, this process between
two members in a group does not scale when we are dealing a communication process where members
in the group are changing constantly. Thus, many authors try to get extensions of the two-party
Sensors 2020, 20, 2242 5 of 13
Diffie–Hellman key exchange that scale for dynamic communication group. One of the widest
known works is Cliques, introduced in [16], where the authors provide two different extensions of
the Diffie–Hellman key exchange that behave really efficiently in the rekeying process, using just one
message to this end. In [17], the authors show a serious security issue for one of the extensions
given in [16], unless some authenticating information is used. In [18], the authors provide a
second version of the above-mentioned protocols that use a double Diffie–Hellman key exchange to,
somehow, authenticate the recovered key, although they cannot avoid every menace that a Public Key
Infrastructure does by means of certificates, which are not possible to be used in communication groups
such as those given in an ad-hoc network. However, in both approaches, the initial key agreement
requires too many rounds with many messages going through the communicating group.
This is also the case of [19], i.e., the initial key agreement does not behave in an efficient way as
the number of members increases. A detached approach for the initial key agreement is [20], where
the initial key agreement is carried out just in three rounds, independently of the number of members
in the group, but rekeying operations reveal not to be as efficient as [16].
2.1. The Initial Key Agreement
Let us start by establishing the general setting for the group key management. Participants
in the communication process will be given by the set {U1, . . . Un} agreeing on an elliptic curve E
and a point P in E, being the set points generated by P (possibly the whole set of points of E) of prime
order and big enough to ensure that the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem is hard to solve.
Every participant Ui holds two pairs of private-public keys, say (Ni, NiP), (Xi, XiP). One of these
users will be the group controller that we will denote by Uc, for some c in the set {1, . . . , n} and will
be in charge of sending the initial keying information as well as the following rekeying messages.
The protocol that describes the initial key agreement is given by the following steps.
Protocol:
1. Every user Ui publishes the pair (NiP, XiP), i = 1, . . . , n.








3. Every user Uj, j = 1, . . . , n j 6= c, using his private information, computes
Cj + Nj(NcP) + Xj(XcP)










On the other hand, we can observe that the proposed protocol extends the classical Diffie–Hellman
key exchange over the group of points in an elliptic curve. To do so, we first note that, given P a point
in an elliptic curve, it is equivalent to consider a sum of points NP + XP for N and X random integers
and the point (N + X)P. Thus, when n = 2, user U1 publishes N1P in step 1 and user Uc = U2 sends
N2P and then they compute the common value (N1N2)P in steps 3 and 4.
2.2. The Rekeying Process
Rekeying is necessary whenever a new member joins the group or someone is leaving, but it may
also be needed just due to caducity of the shared key. Let us start by considering this last case.
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The process is simple. The group controller Uc generates a new integer Y and publishes the new









and every member recovers the new common key as in step 3 of the protocol.
In case a member leaves the group, say Ui, then Ci is removed and Uc sends the rekeying message
{YCj}nj=1,j 6=c,i
Finally, in case a new member joins the group, then we can denote him by Un+1, who will hold
his corresponding two pairs of private-public keys (Nn+1, Nn+1P), (Xn+1, Xn+1P) and publish his two
public keys. Then, the group controller sends the rekeying message {C′j}
n+1
j=1,j 6=c where










Nr)P as above, using his private
information (Ni, Xi), i = 1, . . . , n + 1, i 6= c.
2.3. Security Considerations
In the preceding sections, we pointed out that the introduced protocol naturally extends
the Diffie–Hellman key exchange over elliptic curves. It is then also natural that, if an attacker is able
to solve the Diffie–Hellman Problem, i.e., given the public values N1P and N2P, finding (N1N2)P,
then he can get the common key by using (NcNi)P and (XcXi)P for some i = 1, . . . , n, i 6= c. Thus,
we should assume that solving this problem is hard.
In case the Diffie–Hellman problem is hard to solve, then a former user could not get values
(YNcNi)P and (YXcXi)P for some i = 1, . . . , n, i 6= c to get the new key from the rekeying message
after his departure.




Nr)P using his private information Xn+1. However,




Nr)P whenever he cannot get Y from
the pair of (public) points (YNc)P and NcP due to the difficulty of solving the Elliptic Curve Discrete
Logarithm Problem.
Finally, let us observe the importance of using two pairs of private-public keys. Let us assume
















Nr)P is the shared
key. Now, if the number of elements in the subgroup generated by P is a prime q, then computing
x(n− 2)K for x = n− 2 mod q will result in the group key.
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Xr)P that does not reveal anything on the shared key.
3. Results: Performance Analysis
The first attempt to create a group key agreement protocol, by means of Diffie–Hellman, is owed
to Ingemarsson [21]. This protocol, (cited in this paper as ING), has a synchronous startup stage
and executes (n− 1) rounds. Members are logically connected using a ring topology. Each member,
in each round, raises the key received to its exponent and sends this value to the next member.
All the members, after (n− 1) rounds, share the key Kn. A remarkable result, regarding agreement
for groups, is owed to Burmester and Desmedt [20]. However, in addition to being efficient, the protocol
has been shown to be safe, as long as the Diffie–Hellman problem is safe. Instead, the protocol,
named BD, is not very suitable for dynamic groups: all members of the group have to refresh their
keys to avoid information leakage.
Regarding communication costs (bandwidth), in our case, our protocol is the one that less
bandwidth needs as it only requires 1 messages being sent (see Table 1). Another relevant aspect of
the efficiency shown by the protocol is the number of messages received and sent per each member
since this involves a series of computations that consume time and resources. It is worth noting that
messages sent by non-controller users are as small as 2∗size_of_the_datatype. The size of the message
sent by the controller is bigger but can be sent efficiently. If we are doing arithmetic with 32 bit-integers,
the size of the message sent by the Uc needs to be 64 ∗ (2(n− 1)) bits.
Table 1. Comparison of protocols.
```````````Parameter
Protocol ING BD Ours
Rounds n− 1 2 2
# messages n(n− 1) 2n (n− 1)
1 by Uc
Msgs sent n− 1 2 1
1 Uc
Msgs received n− 1 n + 1 1
Modular Exp. by Ui n n + 1 -
Modular Mult. by Ui - - 4 by Ui
2(n− 1) + 1 Uc
Figure 4 shows that response time of nodes opperating at the sensor network level ranges from
10 µs to 10 ms. It is worth noting that avoiding Modular Exponentiation is important to get all nodes
operating fast. Table 1 illustrates clearly that our protocol involves the least overhead with respect
to the communication infrastructure: as part of the protocol, each member (node) sends a unique
message and receives just one. The protocol is designed to scale well being the unique bottleneck the
computation that Uc needs to do as the number of users is increased.
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Figure 4. Response times intervals accepted as efficient.
If we come to refer again to the efficiency of the protocols, we can mention that the ECC is
significantly faster than legacy methods that were based in the exponentiation on a finite field, while
providing the same level of security (keeping response times in the ranges depicted in Figure 4).
For example, utilizing our protocol, a given security is achieved. For example, with a key size of
160 bits, it is required that the ING and BD protocols use a key size of 1024 bits to achieve the same
level of security. It is worth noting that, although a point on a curve is defined by two coordinates,
all elliptic curves are symmetric with respect to the x-axis and then only coordinate x is represented for
each point. Coordinate y is calculated rather than stored and an extra bit is added to indicate whether
the point in question is on the positive side or the negative side.
3.1. Evaluation of the Protocol
The sensor nodes as well as the main nodes of the sensor network were run with the configuration
of a Minimum Viable Device (MVD), see Figure 5, which is a device that is equipped with, typically,
an ARM processor with chipset Qualcomm MSM8974 Snapdragon 800, CPU Quad-core 2.3 GHz Krait
400, GPU Adreno 330 (not used), Storage: 16/32 GB. RAM 2 GB (this is a limiting factor for the Uc but
we, still, need a high number of nodes to reach it). This sets up the configuration of the physical nodes
used for evaluation purposes.
Figure 5. Node of the sensor network.
We emulated the mentioned MVD using gem5 [22], which is a cycle-accurate micro-architectural
simulator. For micro-architectural simulation with the ARM instruction set architecture (ISA), currently
only the out-of-order model (O3) is functional. This model can boot unmodified Linux images in the
Full-System (FS) mode, which simulates a complete system.
There is a clear need to assign the most powerful node as the Uc part of the protocol as
the computation will be increased with the numbers of users and this affects the rest of the protocol.
Users U1 to Uj except the controller (from i = 1, . . . , n) always operate four modular multiplications
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and a sum with a number (Cj) whose size is based on the number of users. Figure 6 shows that node
representing Uc role in the protocol spends more time in operations when the size of the integers are
bigger. We tested native datatypes, with non-native datatypes Uc experiencing a bigger delay. In any
case, the protocol performs well for a huge number of nodes such as 1024.
Figure 6. Time Uc needs to calculate the initial key agreement message.
Figure 7 shows that the real bottleneck is found with the memory needed to hold the message
that needs to be sent to the rest of the nodes, as it is a data structure containing a list of items whose
size is proportional to the number of participating nodes. Figure 7 shows that even with 1024 nodes
and using keys of size 1024, the size of the message is below 1 MB (0.523776 MB).
Figure 7. Size of the message created by Uc.
3.1.1. Testbed for a Physical Node
Despite the fact that the tests carried out in emulated environments involve defining
the lower performance level of this proposal, physical nodes have also been included to test
the protocol’s efficiency.
The node has been prepared to allow reduced energy consumption due to kernel unnecessary
activities. For this purpose, a strategy of modifying the used kernel architecture has been adopted,
eliminating unnecessary modules and drivers in a node dedicated to the collection of sensor
information and its subsequent sending to higher layer nodes for processing. These nodes, for example,
must eliminate everything related to graphic servers, or with policies such as those implemented in
udev, sound drivers, etc. All this allows the memory footprint to be less, the activities of the node to be
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exclusively those that are necessary, avoiding unnecessary energy consumption, or even exposing the
node (and the whole infrastructure) to uncontrolled attacks due to vulnerabilities in libraries.
YOCTO has been used to create the dedicated image. Images are created through recipes for
embedded systems.The Yocto Project http://www.yoctoproject.org is an open-source industry led
consortium that supports Linux-based system platforms for many embedded system applications
for a wide variety of processors. The precursor of the yocto project was the OpenEmbedded project
http://www.openembedded.org built on the Angstrom distributed kernel.
Table 2 shows data (in milliseconds) for the initial key agreement for a physical node, using
64-bit data types, in a network with 1, 10, 100, and 1000 nodes. Messages latency, below 1 ms, can be
ignored in this environment as messages are sent in the WSN environment exclusively (not involving
the communication with external nodes -cloud servers, etc.).
Table 2. Time (in ms) to get a node fully available (initial key agreement) in the secured wireless sensor
network (WSN), using keys of 1024 bits.
1 Node 10 Nodes 100 Nodes 1000 Nodes
0.42 0.49 0.78 1.91
3.1.2. Extending the Scalability of the Protocol
Figure 8 shows how the nodes can be reorganized when Uc gets overloaded. As the number of
members grows, the requirements for each the controller node is increased. Limited capabilities of
the controller node set a limit to the number of participants.
Figure 8. Scaling of the protocol.
Figure 8 shows that, for an efficient number of members (step 1 in Figure 8), adding a new member
should be avoided. A node of the group switches its behavior to create an extra subgroup, using a
private session key. Node 5 (for this example) is subgrouped to node 3. Node 3 publishes a list of nodes
being supervised. Node 3 retransmits all the messages received to all the members of its subgroup using
a key swap. Messages sent from nodes within the subgroup are forwarded to the general group. Node
3 acts as a proxy (with NAT services). When node 3 leaves, then a message is sent to the subgroup to
look for a new subgroup controller.
This approach allows that session keys can be generated faster, as the nodes are segmented.
Each segment can operate concurrently. Thus, (i) less memory per node is required, (ii) nodes create
groups faster, and (iii) there is extra computation added to each message reception as they must be
accessed with a session key and then re-sent with a different session key, but, as the subgroups are not
a bottleneck, this operation should not have an effect.
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4. Conclusions
The infrastructures that support its business intelligence in the generation of strategies based on
data processing must not only ensure the processing infrastructure but also ensure that the sensor nodes
that monitor fundamental parameters for the crops and its evolution operate reliably and correctly.
To ensure the quality of data, there is vast literature, which shows that this is a problem that has
generated awareness. However, preventing the identity of a node from being supplanted, or avoiding a
node outside the infrastructure to inject data are topics that generate interest in the scientific community
but are not yet as well developed.
In this article, we have proposed the design of a distributed and efficient key exchange method
as well as the implementation of a protocol based on the key exchange method, using elliptic
curve cryptography that provides a solution to security problems in IoT and WSN architectures
and frameworks dedicated to precision agriculture and smart-agro. The efficiency and performance
against well established protocols in the field of key exchange methods have been demonstrated.
The proposed method can be used in any scenario of the smart agro sector sensor nodes are
used to collect different data as pH, temperature, humidity, wind, meteo, etc., which are sent to
more complex systems in charge of making decisions based on the processing of the received data.
Examples of these decisions are the amount of water to be sent to the plots or to a certain group
of olive trees, or some other strategic decisions as time to start harvesting based on the color of
the fruit, leaf, etc. Depending on the characteristics of the environment where the implementation of
the IoT system is carried out, securing the system may become a challenging task as different types of
threats must be considered. Just as an example, in [3], a list of security threats and managing risks,
is presented: vulnerable software/code, privacy threats, cloning of things, malicious substitution
of things, eavesdropping attacks, man-in-the-middle attack, firmware attacks, extraction of private
information, routing attack, elevation of privilege, and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Apart from
the previously mentioned security threats, physical attacks that the IoT deployment may face are also
possible. Our protocol enables the damaged sensor to be aware of the malfunction and request to be
excluded from the secure comm group. However, this is possible in case the node belongs to such
a group and thus the damaged sensor sends no data to the upper layers. The main aspect is that
the IoT devices must be protected. Another threat to the devices deployed on the field is the possibility
that they might be replaced with malicious nodes, providing the attacker with access to the network.
The deployed devices may also be susceptible to malicious code and false data injection, leading to
incorrect results and the malfunctioning of the system. This issue is successfully solved by the protocol,
as shown in the mathematical proofs and tests.
The proposed method and protocol can be implemented in devices with severe constraints
on computational resources. The cryptography used is supported by elliptic curve cryptography,
so the used processors can go from Xmega and the like (used in classic sensor information collection
nodes in the agricultural sector) to more advanced processors such as ARMs given that the use of
circuitry specially dedicated to cryptography is contemplated.
Memory availability is a carefully designed aspect of the protocol. The greater the available
memory, the greater the key used and/or the greater number of nodes that can be part of the secured
network. However, efforts have been made to interfere as little as possible in the memory footprint in
order to leave intact the operation of the data collection and sensor control applications.
The energy consumption is negligible, especially when compared to the node’s own operations:
collecting data from the sensors, preparing the data from the sensors, checking the operating ranges
and sending the information to the collecting node, not only because of the type of computational
tasks but because of the frequency with which they are performed.
The energy consumption is negligible, especially when compared to the node’s own operations:
collecting data from the sensors, preparing the data from the sensors, checking the operating ranges
and sending the information to the collecting node—not only because of the type of computational
tasks but because of the frequency with which they are performed. By using the emulator, we wanted
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to define a lower performance bound for the protocol, independent from the myriad of architectures
available in the market. However, on the ARM device, the rekeying stage lasts no longer than 0.5 to
2 ms depending on the participating nodes.
An interesting aspect regarding embedded systems (important part of Internet of Things) is
the restricted operating environment they are tied to (computing power, power source, . . . ). In this
paper, it has been shown that the method and protocol are highly scalable for group key agreement.
The agreement is made using multicast messages. The proposal devised reduces the time of operation
for the key agreement and the memory footprint. In addition, an alternative method to avoid potential
bottlenecks, when the number of sensor nodes grows rapidly, was also sketched. This method is based
on subgrouping (or segmenting) the network. New members can join these segments. The host node
acts as a bridge between group and subgroup by means of a small process we created.
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